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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the defendant Howell (who contracted with "Mr. 
Rain Gutter", an independent contractor who employed Plaintiff) 
have any duty toward Plaintiff since the injury suffered was the 
result of an "open and obvious danger"? 
2. Even if Utah law no longer recognizes the defense 
of the "open and obvious danger" under its comparative negligence 
doctrine, did the Larry Howell have any duty toward Plaintiff 
since he did not own the building in question, did not control it 
and was not subject to the safety regulations applicable only to 
the other defendants? 
REPORTS OF OPINION 
The subject decision has been published in 118 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 64 (CA, 9/28/89). A copy of the decision is No. 1 of 
the Appendix. 
JURISDICTION 
1. The decision sought to be reviewed was entered on 
September 28, 1989. 
2. There has been no order respecting a rehearing and 
an order granting an extension of time for one day was entered 
herein on October 30, 1989. 
3. No cross petition has been filed. 
4. Jurisdiction of this court is invoked on the basis 
of Section 78-2-2(3,a) U.C.A. 1953. 
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CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF EXPRESS LAW 
There are no controlling provisions of express law. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case involves personal injuries suffered by an 
employee of "Mr. Rain Gutter", an independent contractor who 
undertook to install a rain gutter on a building erected by a 
general contractor who came in contact with a high voltage wire 
which was too close to the building. Suit was filed against the 
utility company, the building contractor, the materials supplier 
(Howell), the building owner and operator. Plaintiff settled as 
to the utility company and the general contractor. The Court 
granted summary judgment motions as to the other defendants. The 
Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that the existence of an 
"open and obvious danger" did not relieve the defendants of their 
duty to either elevate the power lines or give adequate warning 
of them to Plaintiff. 
FACTS 
The facts as they relate to the decision sought to be 
reviewed are that the only reference to them in that decision is 
as follows (from pages 8 and 9): 
"Lastly, we address the summary judgment 
in favor of Durfee and Howell. Donahue's 
claim against these two defendants is based 
on their roles in procuring and supervising 
the construction of the DVF warehouse, 
including allowing the active power line to 
remain so near the warehouse roof while 
Donahue worked. Apparently, the only basis 
for summary judgment in their favor was the 
open and obvious nature of the danger posed 
by the power line. As we held above, the 
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mere obviousness of danger does not support 
summary judgment under these facts, and it 
must also be reversed as to both Durfee and 
Howell." 
The facts as they relate to this petition are as 
follows: 
1. Defendant Howell sells materials used in the 
erection of metal buildings (Deposition of Larry Howell ["Howell 
depo."] R 669, pp. 13-15). 
2. Defendant Howell at purchaser's request will 
arrange for a licensed contractor to construct a building in 
accordance with purchaser's plans and specifications using the 
materials referred to in No. 1 above (Howell depo. R 669, p. 29). 
3. Defendant Howell at purchaser's request will act 
as the agent for purchaser in obtaining the necessary building 
permits to erect the building referred to above (Howell depo. R 
669, p. 28). 
4. Defendant Howell sold to defendants Durfee and 
Delta Valley Foods the materials contained in the building in 
question and arranged for the construction contract between those 
defendants and ABCO Construction Corporation (Howell depo. R 669, 
pp. 53, 54) . 
5. Defendant Howell agreed with defendant Durfee to 
have certain guttering installed on the subject building, 
selected "Mr. Rain Gutter" from the Yellow Pages of the local 
telephone directory to do the work for him as an independent 
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contractor and paid the company for doing so (Howell depo. R 669, 
pp. 81, 82). 
ARGUMENT 
The decision which is the subject matter of this 
Petition is in conflict with this Court's decision in Ellertson 
v. Dansie, 576 P2d 867 (Utah 1978) which upheld the "open and 
obvious danger" doctrine struck down in the Court of Appeals. 
The decision itself said that Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware 
Co., 631 P2d 865 (Utah, 1981) "does cast doubt on the propriety 
of our conclusion here" (p. 7, footnote 3). 
Said decision also so far departs from a correct 
understanding of and application of the facts (treating Howell 
as if he were an owner of property or one whose actions caused 
the injury) that is accepted and usual in the course of judicial 
proceeding as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of 
supervision. 
The decision in question ties the "open and obvious 
dangers" doctrine to a contributory negligence system (see page 
3) even though this Court's decision in Ellertson did not do so. 
The latter case simply held that where the danger is "just as 
observable to invitee as to the owner" there is "no duty to warn 
or to protect the invitee" (p. 868). Therefore, absent a duty, 
the first element of a negligence action (Williams v. Melbv, 699 
P2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985) is not present and hence there is no 
negligence with respect hereto in the first essential instance 
and hence nothing to compare. 
8 
If the trial court was correct in determining that as a 
matter of law the defendants (or any of them) are not liable, 
then its judgment should be affirmed even if the assigned reason 
("open and obvious danger") is not the correct reason for the 
judgment being correct. 
The Court of Appeals did not address any of the reasons 
Howell urged for the affirmance of the summary judgment in the 
District Court. The reasons advanced in his brief there and 
which he urges upon this Court appear as No. 2 in the Appendix. 
In urging affirmance in said alternate grounds, 
petitioner is not appealing from an adverse ruling on those 
grounds, but respectfully points out that they have never been 
addressed as the Court of Appeals did not apply the applicable 
facts to the law. The Court of Appeals simply did not address 
those issues and should have done so. 
CONCLUSION 
For reasons set forth above petitioner respectfully 
submits that this petition should be granted as the case is very 
significant in settling Utah law with respect to "open and 
obvious dangers". 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of October, 1989. 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Respondent Howell 
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ORME, Judge: 
Plaintiff Patrick Donahue appeals the district court's 
entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants Delta Valley 
Foods ("DVF"), John Durfee, and Larry Howell. Donahue filed 
this negligence action seeking to recover damages for injuries 
he suffered when he contacted an electrical power line while 
installing a rain gutter on DVF's warehouse. The district 
court concluded the power line constituted an open and obvious 
danger and, accordingly, DVF, Durfee, and Howell owed no duty 
to warn Donahue of the danger or otherwise protect him from 
it. We reverse and remand. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880227-CA 
F I L E D 
SEP 2 8*89 
FACTS 
Summary judgment is proper only where Hthere is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). "In reviewing a summary judgment, we analyze the facts 
and inferences in a light most favorable to the losing party.-
CQPPQr State Lgaginq COt Vt Blagkgr Appliance fr Furniture COt/ 
770 P.2d 88, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Accordingly, we set 
forth the facts as contended by Donahue. 
John Durfee, DVF's general manager, hired Larry Howell, a 
steel building salesman, to organize the construction of a new 
warehouse for DVF. Howell's duties included procuring the 
necessary building materials and locating a suitable 
contractor. With Durfee's consent, Howell hired ABCO 
Construction Corp. to erect the warehouse* 
By spring of 1982, the warehouse was mostly complete and 
Howell hired MMr. Rain Gutter,H Donahue's employer, to install 
a gutter to promote proper water drainage. On August 18, 1982, 
Donahue was assigned to assist with the DVF warehouse project. 
Donahue was required to work from atop the warehouse roof, 
where a 7200 volt high-tension power line operated by Utah 
Power and Light loomed approximately four to five feet 
overhead. Apparently, Donahue stood up during the gutter's 
installation and the top of his head struck the power line, 
causing a severe electrical shock and his resulting fall from 
the warehouse roof. Donahue was not warned about the powerline 
but saw it and perceived the potentially fatal danger which it 
posed. 
In July of 1984, Donahue brought this negligence action 
against DVF, Durfee, Howell, ABCO, and Utah Power and 
Light.1 DVF, Durfee, and Howell moved for summary judgment, 
contending they owed no duty to warn Donahue or otherwise 
protect him from the power line as it constituted an open and 
obvious danger. See, e.g., Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande W. 
R.R., 16 Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751, 753-54 (1964). The 
district court agreed and entered summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants. 
Donahue appeals, advancing several related arguments. 
However, the dispositive issue on appeal is whether the open 
and obvious danger rule is an absolute bar to Donahue's action 
under Utah's comparative negligence system. We hold that even 
1. Donahue entered into settlements with ABCO and Utah Power 
and Light, and they are not parties to this appeal. 
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assuming the power line was an open and obvious danger, Donahue 
is nonetheless entitled to have the finder of fact compare his 
negligence, if any, in encountering the power line with any 
negligence attributable to the defendants in creating or 
allowing such a dangerous condition to exist. 
We first address this issue as it pertains to Donahue's 
claim against DVF based on its ownership of the warehouse. 
TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO LANDOWNER LIABILITY 
Historically, a landowner's duty of care owing to persons 
entering his or her land varied with the nature of the visit. 
£££/ g_*_g., Tias v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 441 (Utah 1979). But 
see Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985) 
(abandoning the traditional common law distinctions and instead 
imposing a duty of "reasonable care in all circumstances," at 
least toward the landowner's tenant). Accord English v. 
Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Gregory v. 
Fourthwest Invs., Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Under the traditional view a landowner has no duty to warn 
guests of "open and obvious dangers," regardless of the purpose 
of the visit. See, e.g., Ellertson v. Dansie, 576 P.2d 867, 
868 (Utah 1978); Steele, 396 P.2d at 753-54. This doctrine is 
commonly known as the open and obvious danger rule, and it 
precludes an injured guest's recovery against the landowner for 
any injuries sustained through encountering an obvious risk. 
The justification for the rule appears to be that encountering 
an obvious risk is negligence as a matter of law and, at least 
under a contributory negligence system, a plaintiff who is even 
only slightly negligent is barred from recovery. An alternative 
justification is that while a landowner has a duty to warn 
guests of dangers on his or her property, the landowner's 
failure to do so is harmless where the danger is readily 
apparent. 
The open and obvious danger rule has been sharply 
criticized. An often-cited basis for attack is that the rule 
establishes the landowner's duty of care according to what is 
known or should be known by the guest. See, e.g., Keller v. 
Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 671 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Ct. 
App, 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d 
1208 (1984). These critics argue that a more logical approach 
treats the guest's knowledge of obvious danger as bearing only 
on the reasonableness of the guest's subsequent conduct, not as 
relieving the landowner of its duty of care. See, e.g., 
Keller, 671 P.2d at 1117 (the open and obvious danger rule does 
not differentiate between those facts relevant to the 
landowner's duty of care and those facts establishing a total 
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or partial defense to liability); Parker v. Highland Park, 
Inc. , 565 S.W.2d 512, 521 (Tex. 1978) (HA plaintiffs 
knowledge, whether it is derived from a warning or from the 
facts, even if the facts display the danger openly and 
obviously, is a matter that bears upon [plaintiff's] own 
negligence; it should not affect the defendant's duty.H). 
Others have criticized the open and obvious danger rule for 
ignoring reality. As the Texas Supreme Court observed, 
[t]here are many instances in which a person 
of ordinary prudence may prudently take a 
risk about which he knows, or has been 
warned about, or that is open and obvious to 
him. . . . One's conduct after he is 
possessed of full knowledge, under the 
circumstances may be justified or deemed 
negligent depending on such things as the 
plaintiff's status, the nature of the 
structure, the urgency or lack of it for 
attempting to reach a destination, the 
availability of an alternative, one's 
familiarity or lack of it with the way, the 
degree and seriousness of the danger, the 
availability of aid from others, the nature 
and degree of darkness, the kind and extent 
of a warning, and the precautions taken 
under the circumstances . . . . 
Parker, 565 S.W.2d at 520. Se£ Keller, 671 P.2d at 1117. 
Courts subscribing to this view have either completely 
abandoned the open and obvious danger rule, as did Texas in 
Parker, or, at a minimum, refuse to apply the rule as an 
absolute bar in actions brought by plaintiffs who, like 
Donahue, entered the property in connection with their 
employment duties. See, e.g., Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 
536 F.2d 505, 509 (2nd Cir. 1976) (a vessel owner must 
anticipate that a longshoreman may voluntarily encounter an 
obvious danger to avoid losing his job); Brown v. Martin 
Marietta Corp., 690 P.2d 889, 892 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (where 
an employee's duty renders an obvious danger unavoidable, 
injured employee is not barred as a matter of law from recovery 
against landowner); Shannon v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 
181 Mont. 269, 593 P.2d 438, 440-41 (1979) (where an employee 
must either forego employment or encounter danger, the 
obviousness of the danger will not completely bar the 
employee's recovery for any resulting injury). 
A related approach is articulated in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts (1965). Section 343A provides that a 
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landowner is not liable for a guest's injuries resulting from 
an open and obvious danger unless the landowner Hshould 
anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness." A 
few jurisdictions, apparently including Utah, have seen merit 
in this approach. See, e.g., Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 16 
Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 918, 920 (1964) ("In order to justify 
holding that a jury question as to negligence exists, where 
injury has resulted from an observable hazard, it is essential 
•that there be something wnicn could be regarded as tending to 
distract the [injured person'si attention or to prevent him 
from seeing the danger . . . . " ) ; bantos v. Scinoia Steam 
Navigation Co., b^8 F.2a 480 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying 
Restatement approach under Jones Act), aff'd, 451 U.S. 156 
(1981); Scales v. St. Louis-San Francisco Rv. Co., 2 Kan. App. 
2d 491, 582 P.2d 300, 306 (1978) (a landowner may be liable for 
injuries suffered by a worker encountering an obviously 
dangerous condition during periods of foreseeable distraction). 
Thus, the open and obvious danger rule is not beyond 
reproach even within the contributory negligence system from 
which it arose. 
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK 
Utah has now abandoned its contributory negligence system. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1987), entitled "Comparative 
Negligence," provides in part that H[t]he fault of a person 
seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by that person. 
He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose 
fault exceeds his own." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(2) defines 
"fault" as "any actionable breach of legal duty . . . 
including, but not limited to, negligence in all its degrees, 
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, . . . ." We hold 
that by enacting the above statutory provisions and 
establishing a comparative negligence system, the Utah 
Legislature has by necessary implication abolished the open and 
obvious danger rule as an absolute bar to an injured guest's 
recovery. Our conclusion is premised on two grounds. 
First, the open and obvious danger rule is fundamentally 
incompatible with a comparative negligence scheme, which 
requires the finder of fact to allocate liability for an injury 
based on the relative responsibility of the parties involved. 
The adoption of a comparative negligence system amounts to an 
expression by the Legislature that the harsh and inflexible 
result of total victory or unconditional defeat compelled by 
the traditional contributory negligence system, including the 
open and obvious danger rule, is no longer acceptable. As most 
convincingly articulated by Judge Burnett for the Idaho Court 
of Appeals, 
880227-CA 
[p]rior to the advent of comparative 
negligence, contributory negligence was an 
absolute bar to recovery. Thus, it made 
little difference whether a known or 
obvious condition excused a land 
possessor's duty to an invitee, or simply 
insulated the possessor from liability for 
any breach of such duty. But under the 
comparative negligence system, the 
difference is profound. If duty is not 
excused by a known or obvious danger, the 
injured invitee might recover, albeit in a 
diminished amount, if his negligence in 
encountering the risk is found to be less 
than the land possessor's negligence in 
allowing the dangerous condition or 
activity on his property. In contrast, if 
the invitee's voluntary encounter with a 
known or obvious danger were deemed to 
excuse the landowner's duty, then there 
would be no negligence to compare—and, 
therefore, no recovery. The effect would 
be to resurrect contributory negligence as 
an absolute bar to recovery in cases 
involving a land possessor's liability to 
invitees. 
Keller, 671 P.2d at 1118-19. See also 0'Donne11 v. Citv of 
Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1281-82 (Wyo. 1985). While the Idaho 
Supreme Court did not immediately embrace Judge Burnett's 
entire analysis, see Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 107 Idaho 
593, 691 P.2d 1208, 1210-11 (1984) (limiting the basis for 
court of appeals holding), the court ultimately adopted that 
view and abandoned the open and obvious danger rule altogether, 
citing its incompatibility with Idaho's comparative negligence 
system. See Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321, 
1325 (1989). In abandoning the traditional rule, the court 
noted that M[w]e recognize the role stare decisis plays in the 
judicial process. But we are not hesitant to reverse ourselves 
when a doctrine . . . has proven over time to be unjust or 
unwise." Id. at 1328. We are likewise convinced that the open 
and obvious danger rule is incompatible with Utah's comparative 
negligence system and join Idaho and a number of other states 
in announcing its abandonment.2 See, e.g., Cox v. J.C. 
2. The middle ground taken by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Keller, namely that of recognizing an exception for injured 
employees rather than rejecting outright the open and obvious 
danger doctrine, is not without attraction as a more cautious 
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Penney Co., 741 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1987) (en banc); Woolston v. 
Wells. 297 Or. 548, 687 P.2d 144 (1984); Parker, 565 S.W.2d at 
517; O'Donnell, 696 P.2d at 1284. 
Our second point of analysis is premised upon the fact 
that the assumption of risk doctrine has been expressly 
abandoned in Utah as a complete bar to recovery due to its 
incompatibility with our comparative negligence system. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(2) (1987). See also Moore y. Burton 
Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 870 (Utah 1981);3 
Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Structo-Lite Bna'q, Inc.. 619 P.2d 306, 
309 (Utah 1980). Accord Peats v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 746 
P.2d 1191, 1193-94 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). It would defy 
rationality to maintain the open and obvious danger rule as a 
complete bar to recovery where the essentially 
indistinguishable assumption of risk doctrine no longer compels 
such a result. See, e.g., Harrison, 768 P.2d at 1325 (open and 
obvious danger rule is a corollary to the assumption of risk 
doctrine and should likewise be abandoned); Parker, 565 S.W.2d 
at 518 (assumption of risk doctrine is inseparable from the 
(footnote 2 continued) 
and conservative approach to the law's development. However, 
there is no defensible basis for making such fine distinctions 
in view of our conclusion that the open and obvious danger 
rule, at least as a total bar to liability, has been 
legislatively washed away with the enactment in this state of a 
comparative negligence scheme. And as discussed in the text, 
the Idaho court reached this very conclusion in Harrison only 
five years after its decision in Keller. 
3. In Moore, 631 P.2d at 868, the Utah Supreme Court also held 
the defendant landowner was entitled to a jury instruction that 
he has no duty to warn a business invitee of an obvious danger, 
but the failure to give such an instruction under the 
particular facts was held to be harmless error. This result 
does cast doubt on the propriety of our conclusion here. While 
our Supreme Court recognized in Moore that the assumption of 
risk doctrine has been abandoned as a complete bar to recovery 
under sections 78-27-37 and -38, it failed to consider the 
effect of those provisions on the open and obvious danger rule, 
most likely because that point was not argued by the parties. 
631 P.2d at 870. We believe that had the parties in Moore 
analyzed the open and obvious danger rule in this light, the 
Court would have held that there are no significant differences 
between it and the assumption of risk doctrine, abandoning both 
under our comparative negligence system. 
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open and obvious danger rule). See also Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-37(2) (1987) (defining "fault" for purposes of the 
comparative negligence scheme as including -assumption of risk-
and "negligence in all its degrees"). 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted section 
78-27-37(2) to abolish the last clear chance doctrine as a 
complete bar to recovery. 
It is widely recognized that such 
doctrines as assumption of risk, last 
clear chance, and discovered peril 
resemble the old contributory negligence 
doctrine in that they are -all or nothing-
doctrines in terms of recovery by the 
plaintiff . . . . 
[T]here seem to be no good reasons to 
retain [the last clear chance] doctrine 
which was originally devised because of 
another doctrine, i.e., contributory 
negligence, which the state of Utah has 
statutorily abolished as an absolute bar 
to recovery. 
Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 598 (Utah 1982) (emphasis 
added). We likewise find no good reasons to retain the open 
and obvious danger rule as an absolute bar to recovery. The 
summary judgment against Donahue and in favor of DVF must 
accordingly be reversed.4 
JUDGMENT AGAINST OTHER DEFENDANTS 
Lastly, we address the summary judgment in favor of Durfee 
and Howell. Donahue's claim against these two defendants is 
based on their roles in procuring and supervising the 
4. Our decision in this case will no doubt narrow somewhat the 
range of cases involving landowner liability in which summary 
judgment will be appropriate. However, summary judgment will 
still be available, even though the landowner will be unable to 
take refuge behind the open and obvious danger doctrine, in 
situations where the landowner establishes undisputed facts 
showing he was not negligent as a matter of law. Such 
situations include plaintiffs who are solely responsible for 
creating the dangerous condition on defendant's land. E.g., 
English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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construction of the DVF warehouse, including allowing the 
active power line to remain so near the warehouse roof while 
Donahue worked. Apparently, the only basis for summary 
judgment in their favor was the open and obvious nature of the 
danger posed by the power line. As we held above, the mere 
obviousness of danger does not support summary judgment under 
these facts, and it must also be reversed as to both Durfee and 
Howell. 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the summary judgment and remand this matter for 
trial or such other proceedings as may be appropriate 
consistent with this opinion. At trial, the finder of fact 
must compare the reasonableness of Donahue's conduct under all 
the circumstances in encountering the power line with the 
reasonableness of DVF's, Durfee's, and Howell's conduct in 
creating and allowing the potentially deadly power line to 
remain so near the warehouse roof, in an activated state, while 
work was being done on the roof. If any damages are warranted 
under this analysis, they must be awarded consistent with Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1987), as discussed above. The parties 
will bear their own costs of this appeal* 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
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APPENDIX NO. 2 
APPENDIX NO. 2 
ARGUMENT 
A. DEFENDANT HOWELL HAD NO DUTY OF CARE TOWARD 
PLAINTIFF 
In order for any defendant to be liable in a negligence 
case the defendant must owe a duty to the plaintiff, 57 Am Jur 2d 
378, 379 (Negligence, Sec. 33). Did the defendant Howell owe a 
duty to the plaintiff? 
Plaintiff's first statement on this point under 
Argument "Afl is the "Defendants breached their duty of care to 
plaintiff when they constructed a metal building too close to an 
existing energized high-tension electric wire, which resulted in 
the creation of an unreasonably dangerous working environment." 
(p.8) The fact is the defendant Howell did not build the 
subject building at all (his only involvement was to assist the 
owner in arranging for others to build the building). 
The second statement on this point is in the next 
sentence where it says "Defendant's actions" violated a cited 
regulation. The defendant Howell was not involved in the 
"actions referred to (building the building too close for safety) 
so could not have violated said regulation. In addition the 
regulation expressly confers the duty on "the employer." Since 
defendant Howell was not the employer of the plaintiff even under 
the broad definition set forth on page 9 to include "every 
person, firm and private corporation who have workmen employed at 
the construction site" (since defendant employed no one who was 
at the construction site, the cited regulation did not create any 
duty on this defendant^ 
The fourth and final basis asserted by plaintiff as an 
"alternative" basis for a duty of care toward plaintiff is that 
of a "business invitee." After citing two Utah cases (Glenn v. 
Gibbons & Reed Co., 265 P.2d 1019, Utah 1954 and Williams v. 
Melby, 699 P.2d 723, Utah 1985) which did not involve liability 
of a non property owner such as defendant Howell is in this case, 
plaintiff cites Prosser on the duties "upon owners and occupiers 
of land." Since defendant Howell was neither an owner or 
occupier of the land in question there is no basis for imposing 
any duty on him based on the principles of a "business invitee." 
B. DEFENDANT HOWELL HAD NO AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO WARN 
PLAINTIFF BASED ON EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP OR OTHERWISE. 
Contrary to plaintiff's assertion on page 5, defendant 
Howell did not hire the plaintiff to do the guttering work in 
question. He was hired to do that by his employer Eugene 
Strickland (Deposition of Patrick Donahue, pages 136, 137). 
The only other basis suggested in plaintiff's brief for 
an affirmative duty to warn plaintiff was defendant Howell's 
observing the power lines in question about three months prior to 
the accident (page 12). No legal precedent to sustain liability 
on such a basis has been cited and the defendant submits none 
exists (See Section 41 of Negligence in 57 Am Jur 2d 389 
captioned "Moral or humanitarian considerations; duty to aid or 
protect others" where it states: 
As a general rule, the law imposed no 
duty on one person actively to assist in the 
preservation of the person or property of 
another from injury, even though the means by 
which harm can be averted are in his 
possession. The law does not undertake to 
make men render active service to their 
neighbors at all times because a good or 
brave man would do so. 
If such knowledge alone is a predicate for liability, 
Earl Dickman, Douglas Stout and Darrell Martin who also saw those 
lines some three weeks prior to the accident (and long after 
defendant Howell saw them over a month before) should also have 
been sued individually and they were not. 
C. ANY NEGLIGENCE ON PART OF DEFENDANT HOWELL WAS 
SUPERSEDED BY SUBSEQUENT NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THIRD PARTIES 
SO AS NOT TO BE A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURIES. 
Defendant Howell acquired knowledge of the danger which 
later caused the tragedy in question on May 19, 1981 (page 12 of 
Plaintiff's Brief). Over a month later two officials of Utah 
Power & Light Company discussed the particular danger with an 
employee of the other defendants (pages 5, 6 of Plaintiff's 
Brief). Certainly those officials were in the best position of 
anyone to have caused the subject lines to be elevated and the 
danger completely removed. An independent subsequent act of 
negligence is generally a superseding cause which precludes the 
initial negligence from being a proximate cause (Corpus Juris 
Secundum expresses the law as follows in Section 28 of Torts (p. 
943) : 
There, in the sequence of events between 
the original default and the final results, 
an entirely independent unforeseen cause 
intervenes sufficient to stand as the cause 
of the mischief, the second cause is 
ordinarily regarded as the proximate, and the 
other as the remote, cause. 
Defendant Howell directs the Court's attention to the 
following parts of Plaintiff's Brief to consider in connection 
with the arguments for liability therein set forth: 
1. Plaintiff states in argument "A" that 
"DEFENDANTS... CONSTRUCTED AND MAINTAINED A BUILDING " 
It is clear from the facts that defendant Howell did 
not construct (ABCO did) or maintain the subject building (Delta 
Foods did). At most it can be said that he assisted the 
defendant owner in doing so. Since Argument "A" is obviously 
based on facts that are erroneous, the conclusion is likewise 
faulty. 
2. The plaintiff in lumping defendant Howell into 
"defendants" implies that he comes within the broad definition of 
"employer" so as to be subject to the regulation on safety cited 
on page 8. No proof exists in the record, however, that this 
defendant ever had any "workmen employed at a construction site." 
To contend that plaintiff had been employed by this defendant is 
to confuse a purchaser of the services of an independent 
contractor with one who purchases the services of workers as an 
employer. To extend employers' duties to consumers would render 
a vast portion of our population liable for acts of businesses 
they have no power to control. 
3. The implication of the quotation on page 11 is 
that the defendant Howell had the duty "incumbent upon owners and 
occupiers of land." Nothing exists in the record to impose such 
duties on this defendant as he had no ownership interest in or 
right of possession over the subject building. 
4. Under Argument "B" plaintiff cites the Briqham 
case where the injured party is a ten year old boy. That fact 
certainly ought to disqualify it as persuasive regarding an adult 
worker with respect to "open and obvious dangers." 
5. The deposition quotation of plaintiff on page 18 
obviously conflicts with his quotation on the next page where he 
says "I'm always careful around power lines" but even if the 
former is determined to be correct (that he can't distinguish 
between the types of lines) that is more reason, rather then 
less, why he should stay entirely clear of any lines since the 
former proved he was aware that both kinds exist while the later 
makes it clear he knew power lines were dangerous. 
6. Much is made on pages 18 and 19 that the warning 
given by defendant Durfee was general rather than specific. It 
should be noted, however, that this warning was given to an 
expert, to wit plaintiff's employer, not to plaintiff. To 
presume that the expert in turn did not make the warning to 
plaintiff specific is not justifiable. As noted in 5 above, 
however, plaintiff was aware of the danger of power lines 
independent of whatever plaintiff's employer said to him and thus 
a specific warning would not have created an awareness where none 
existed before. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Defendant Howell had no duty, affirmative or 
otherwise, upon which liability could be predicted. 
2. Any negligence of defendant Howell was not the 
cause of plaintiff's injuries because of intervening negligence 
on part of third parties. 
